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Summary
The study of transparency is increasingly a more topical, broadly relevant, but also more under-researched
enterprise. The Asian financial crisis has highlighted not only the welfare consequences of financial sector
transparency, sparking a series of yet unresolved debates, but has also linked this relatively narrow problem
to the broader context of transparency in governance. Its significance has broadened geographically as well
as across different sectors. It has been observed that curtailment of transparency, often on scanty pretexts, is
commonplace even in the highly developed countries. This suggests a broad and possibly radical reform
agenda. Departing from the urgency of these observations, this paper reviews the existing literature on
transparency in finance and governance, indicates remaining knowledge gaps, and offers some hypothesis
on the mutual significance of the two issues.
The first two sections of the paper outlines a conceptual framework for defining and measuring
transparency that distinguishes among its desirable characteristics; access, timeliness, relevance, and
quality. It also suggests methodologies that may produce tractable measures of transparency. Additionally,
it places in context debates concerning transparency; its desirability, contingency, complexity and
regulation. Reviewing critiques of objections against disclosure, the chapter advances a general preference
for transparency, not only in the developing but also in the developed world. Nevertheless, it emphasizes
the need to weigh the costs and benefits of more transparency in designing regulatory policy. In general,
while consequences of information imperfections  are well recognized, the solution is not simply a matter
of more information.
The third section treats the role of transparency in promoting greater financial stability,
acknowledging exceptions to the general preference expressed earlier, in relation to financial stability.  It
treats as priority policy issues the following problems: developing institutional infrastructure, developing
standards and accounting practices, improving incentives for disclosure and balancing countervailing
regulations to minimize perverse incentives generated by safety net arrangements such as deposit
insurance.   An important suggestion is that since institutional development is gradual, relatively simple
regulations such as limits on credit expansion, may be best tailored to developing countries. Implicit in this
section is the notion that there are absolute limits to transparency, in particular for lack of adequate
enforcement.
The last section elaborates on the concomitant link between financial markets and governance,
discussing select consequences of transparency for national-level and local governance, identifying some
policy implications and suggesting further research issues. As illustrated by the case of Indonesia, it argues
that financial reform may be predicated on broader public sector reforms. Again, because formal
institutions take time to develop, it highlights three principles of reform to promote incentives for openness:
harnessing private sector participation in service provision, promoting exit and contestability, and
encouraging "voice" and public participation.  These are now increasingly being integrated to new
innovative data collection and analysis techniques, and to particular dissemination methods promoting
collective action to improve governance and enhance transparency.  The chapter concludes by outlining the
difficulties of implementing greater participation and voice.
                                                   
1 The authors would like to thank Joseph Stiglitz for promoting this effort and providing invaluable
insights, as well as to Amar Bhattacharya, Ronnie Dasgupta, David Dollar, Ray Fisman, Charles Kahn, Phil
Keefer, John Helibrunn, Gill Mehrez, Ashoka Mody, Dilip Mookherjee and Dilip Ratha, for many
comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Peter Lagerquist for assistance with editing.2
I. Case for Transparency
We are concerned about transparency because it enables two interlocked engines
of welfare and development, namely governance and economic markets.  More openness
and information sharing enables the public to make informed political decisions,
improves the accountability of governments, and reduces the scope for corruption.
Greater transparency is also essential to the economy: it improves resource allocation,
enhances efficiency and increases growth prospects. Information imperfections in
markets increase transaction costs and give rise to market failures. Though market
failures hamper the working of all markets, they especially affect capital markets.  In the
recent financial crises literature, several references
2 are made to “lack of transparency”
3
as one of the factors that either caused or contributed to the prolonged crises.
Despite this, today even most ostensibly open and democratic societies lack
sufficient transparency in governance and finance.  As argued by Stiglitz (1999) there is
little reason for this. Arguments against more transparency, while merited in a few
instances, are often not only limited in application, but simply wrong. This essay departs
from this observation, elaborating the means of studying and implementing transparency.
Despite the perceived importance of transparency there has been little theoretical
or empirical effort to study it – for example its role in enhancing long run growth
prospects or improving stability of markets and averting short/medium term crises. In
both former respects complex questions and challenges present themselves. It has been
argued that increased transparency may improve financial stability and reduce market
volatility. Yet, conceptual work 
4 suggests that increased transparency need not be
welfare enhancing and furthermore may increase market volatility. Understanding the
conditions under which more transparency may improve or worsen outcomes will
therefore refine our knowledge and will help shape better policy.
Empirical work is lacking partly because of data problems. These arise from the
difficulty of measuring "transparency" given that it deals with agents who are hiding
information. Therefore a key empirical challenge is to define a measure of transparency
that is empirically tractable. Such an exercise will highlight the requirements of the data
as well as enable us to assess its determinants and evaluate its impact on the outcomes of
interest.
With these considerations in mind, this paper reviews the existing literature on
transparency, points to remaining knowledge gaps and suggests some hypotheses linking
transparency to finance and governance.  From the banking and finance literature, we
focus on the role of transparency in promoting greater financial stability.  The important
challenges to this are the following: meeting infrastructure needs-developing standards
for quality as well as compliance/enforcement, addressing regulatory needs- improving
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incentives for better disclosure, and installing countervailing regulations to minimize
perverse incentives, such as created by insurance or bailout schemes.
As such, it will also discuss the role of international organizations in facilitating
the implementation of transparency, as increased globalization and integration of world
financial markets as well as growth of innovative financing mechanisms demand a
greater scope for disclosure requirements.
We will conclude by relating transparency to the broader role of transparency in
promoting good governance.  They may also circumscribe the former – a lack of
transparency in governments may affect efforts to improve transparency in the
institutions that govern markets. To this end the paper will address the place of press
freedom, freedom of information legislation and an independent judiciary, and the use of
innovative grass roots efforts to use “voice” as a mechanism to improve people’s access
to information. It will also discuss the importance of data and its analysis, and the
dissemination of such practices through various channels as a mechanism to make
participation a potent force in achieving transparency and accountability.
II. Transparency in Context
The following section attempts to elaborate an understanding of how transparency may
be defined and measured for policy purposes. It then provides a framework outlining the
implications of such an understanding. This framework informs subsequent sections,
which address in greater detail the specific problems of improving transparency in the
context of financial markets and in matters of governance more broadly.
Defining Transparency
For the purposes of this paper, transparency describes the increased flow of timely and
reliable economic, social, and political information; about private investors’ use of loans
and the creditworthiness of borrowers; about government service provision, monetary
and fiscal policy; as well as about the activities of international institutions. Contrariwise,
a lack of transparency may be described as someone – whether a government minister, a
public institution, a corporation, or a bank -- deliberately withholding access to, or
misrepresenting information or failure to ensure that the information provided is of
adequate relevance or quality.
Hence, a working understanding of transparency should encompass the following
attributes: acccess, comprehensiveness, relevance, and quality and reliability. They are
detailed below:
Access. Laws and regulations ensure, at least in principle, that information remains
available to all. But information must also be accessible. In part, this is aided  by the
institutions and venues that facilitate its flow. They include media such as newspaper,
radio, TV, public information notices, the Internet, and word of mouth. Lack of education
is detrimental to transparency - it limits the ability of an individual to access, interpret
and use information. Strong equity considerations attend the need for access. Information
should be accessible to all on equal terms. However, it is often profitable to delay or limit4
access to useful information, in which case access becomes hostage to ability to pay.
Therefore there is a need to enforce timely, equitable dissemination of information.
Relevance- Information must be relevant.  Ensuring this is difficult, first because
information is subjective; depositors need information to ensure safety of deposits;
investors need information about liabilities and risks; and the public about current
economic conditions, policies, and so forth. Second as sources of information such as the
Internet proliferate, paradoxically information overload threatens to dilute relevance.
Quality and Reliability - Information should be of good quality and reliable, timely,
complete, fair, consistent and represented in clear and simple terms. Standards for quality
must be ensured, possibly through verification by external agencies or auditors or
standard setting organizations. Consistency in the use of processes to obtain information
and in the formats of information disseminated ensures comparability and so allows
assessment of changes over time. The criteria and methodologies used to assess
information, as well as changes in such methodologies, should be fully disclosed. Such
measures are an important way of preventing deliberate withholding or distortion of
information - lying.  Dishonest reporting is deterred by the presence of various
"watchdog" institutions ranging from professional accountants or agencies, credit
bureaus, an independent press, stakeholder feedback, to even academic researchers.
5
Furthermore, assuring quality and reliability often requires going beyond integrity:
rigorously evaluating signal-to-noise ratios in a piece of data is often a methodological
and empirical challenge even for institutions and individuals of the highest standards of
probity.
Measuring Transparency
These various aspects of transparency invoke specific policies and institutional
arrangements. In order to evaluate these policies, we must able to measure transparency –
a difficult task in part because of the complex understanding of transparency that we have
adopted.  Conceptually, a statistical measure of transparency is the precision of the
information that is obtained, in turn a function of it relevance and finally, its quality.
"Lack of transparency" in the case of accounting information for example, may be
measured by comparing officially disclosed balance sheet information with the
assessments of auditing agencies that investigate firms for credit approval. Highly
transparent firms will have little discrepancy between the officially disclosed information
and that assessed by auditors.  An important prerequisite for such measurement is that the
data of such evaluations is accessible.
Recent attempts to measure transparency have used proxies such as “weak rule of law”
and “corruption” that are associated with lack of transparency but do not fully reflect all
the above considerations. A refinement of this approach is to formulate an index using
proxies for the characteristics outlined above. An attempt to construct an index of
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financial transparency is described in section III. However, a serious impediment to
measuring transparency is poor data quality- detailed information on publicly disclosed
information, the various disclosure standards, evaluations by independent auditors of the
categories of information disclosed. With improved data, one can systematically measure
transparency, identify its determinants, and quantify its impact on the relevant economic
variables. An attempt to measure accounting transparency using data from Indian firms
and assessing its impact on investment activity is currently underway. (Bertrand and
Mullianathan: MIT 1999)
Limits to Transparency?
Before proceeding from measuring transparency to implementing it, it is necessary to
assess if transparency always desirable. Proscriptions against disclosure abound in all
societies. Is there sense in these proscriptions?
As argued by Stiglitz (1999), on the whole societies’ preference should be in favor of
greater openness and transparency. Conceptually, the information economics literature
supports the notion that better information will improve resource allocation and
efficiency in an economy. Disclosure of financial information directs capital to its most
productive uses, leading to efficiency and growth. Lack of transparency can be costly, in
both political and economic terms. It is politically debilitating because it dilutes the
ability of the democratic system to judge and correct government policy, cloaking the
activities of special interests, and creating rents by giving those with information
something to trade. The economic costs of secrecy are equally staggering, affecting not
only aggregate output but also the distribution of benefits and risks in the economy. The
most significant cost is that of corruption, which has a documented adverse effect on
investment and economic growth.
6
Arguments against more transparency while merited in a few instances, are often not only
limited in application, but fundamentally flawed. There is arguably some merit in more
philosophical rights-based exceptions on the grounds of privacy and confidentially. Even
these however need to counter not only the instrumental benefits of transparency, but also
powerful arguments about the intrinsic rights of citizens to know. More dubious are
exceptions made on grounds such as national security, stability, non-interference in
delicate negotiations, or deference to public unity. Notably, some possible exceptions on
the grounds of ensuring stability in financial markets are treated in greater detail in the
next section. To the extent that such appeals are are made, they need to be highly limited,
and the limits exposed to public debate. Particular scrutiny should be directed at
invocations of confidentiality, market stability or national security.
Research to inform such debates is currently inadequate, failing to qualify
arguments both for and against transparency. Most concretely, this pertains to debates on
the need for financial reform. For example, arguments about the need to limit the
transparency of central banks policies are not borne out empirically – though a theoretical
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literature is willing to entertain the notion, as discussed further on. Theoretically, a
greater and less volatile flow of information about its decisions should as likely be able to
stabilize and rationalize rather than disrupt and corrupt financial markets. Indeed, it is
probably true that the less accountable an agency, such as a central bank, the more
transparent it should be. In other instances however, it is not evident that more
information will strengthen financial systems. Examples to the contrary, wherein more
information may worsen credit rationing or increase price volatility, are documented in
Furman and Stiglitz: 1998. Clearly more research, both conceptual and empirical, is
needed to resolve this debate, its implications for the behavior and incentives of firms and
individuals, and on economic outcomes.
Limits to Voluntary Information Disclosure
Though transparency is often desirable, markets rarely induce socially desirable levels of
transparency, not to mention full and voluntary disclosure of information. There are many
reasons why this is so.
First, there are costs associated with information disclosure- collecting,
organizing, and disseminating information involves resources in the form of effort, time,
and money. It is therefore natural to expect that agents will reveal information upto the
point where the marginal benefit from disclosure equals marginal cost, which typically
entails less than full disclosure.
Second, there may be positive payoffs from non-disclosure – for example when
agents interact with each other strategically, revealing more information may result in
loss of competitive advantage, in turn lowering the firm's profitability. Also, it allows
rent extraction, which in turn leads to ex-ante innovation. For example, it is precisely
because hedge funds in the U.S. are not transparent that they are able to generate profits.
If others could see their arbitrage strategies, they could be replicated. In fact under such
circumstances, disclosure regulation may not be desirable. Instead voluntary disclosure
may be socially optimal, given the costs. (see Fishman and Haggerty:1997)
Third, there is a lack of or disclosure because of the presence of externalities.
Externalities may arise when firms’ values are correlated, so that information pertaining
to one firm may be used to value other firms. Theoretical work suggests that because of
such information spillovers there is inefficiency- the socially optimum level of
information is not attained. (Admati and Pfleiderer: 1998) Externalities also explain why
markets may under-supply investments in monitoring and enforcement. Those who
monitor and enforce provide a benefit to all, yet receive no return from other
beneficiaries. Therefore not enough resources are devoted to these activities.
The public good properties of information suggest a role for government in information
acquisition and dissemination. Specifically this may entail creating rules and regulations
specifying disclosure requirements about categories of information, frequency of
disclosure, the standards for disclosed information and so forth. Moreover, since
"perfect" information is rarely achieved even under the best of circumstances, there may
be a need for government enforcement. Generally, transparency is limited by the inherent
difficulties of obtaining information in rapidly changing environments. For example,
sophisticated financial instruments which would make timely assessments of net worth of7
banks and firms are unreliable since markets respond sharply to constant changes in
external factors. Achieving transparency may therefore not be sufficient. Enforcement
mechanisms that ensure accountability by punishing fraudulent behavior, are also
essential. In such circumstances, regulations may be necessary to minimize risks and
ensure stability. As the following section suggests, such regulations need to balance the
costs and benefits from increased disclosure in distinct circumstances.
Regulation in Context
In general, disclosure regulation, which either mandates or encourages
transparency, may be justified when there are externalities and information is costly.
However, the very decision to introduce disclosure regulation, as well as the specific
implementation of such regulation, warrants careful consideration.
First, an assessment should be made as to whether more transparency would
necessarily improve economic outcomes, i.e. whether this may be one of the valid
exceptions referred to above (Furman and Stiglitz:1998). Some research suggests there
are instances where more information may cause speculation and hence greater market
volatility.
7 A recent empirical study (Bushee and Noe: 1999) indicates that firms with
improvements in disclosure practices
8 experience subsequent increases in their level of
stock market volatility. They find that a policy of greater disclosure skews the
composition of investors, toward those with a strong propensity to trade in the short run
because they value it more than longer-term investors. The result of a greater prevalence
of ‘fickle’ traders leads to greater volatility.
Second, even in cases where disclosure regulation is justified, the design of
appropriate disclosure policies requires a careful weighing of the extent of disclosure.
This weighting should be sensitive to its costs and benefits. It should consider what
information should be disclosed, who provides the information and verifies the quality,
what are the enforcement requirements and so forth.
In this regard the literature suggest that in certain circumstances policy should
support only certain kinds of disclosure. Authors such as Blinder (1998), argue that
transparency of central policies makes the bank reputation more sensitive to the outcomes
of its policies. Faust and Svensson (1998) qualify this by arguing that if the central bank's
reputation is completely independent of its actions it loses an important constraint on its
behavior. Theoretical modeling suggests that the results may be higher than average
inflation and more variable inflation and unemployment. This has not however been
confirmed empirically. An attempt at striking a balance on this issue is made by the  U.S.
Federal Reserve Board. It release minutes of open market committee meetings with a six-
week lag, as well as deleting confidential information like names of individuals, foreign
banks and so forth.
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Third, having decided on the extent and nature of disclosure, it is important to
tailor regulation policies to local circumstances. Accordingly, what disclosure policies are
appropriate will depend on the specific institutional and market environment. In
developing countries, with weak institutional and legal environments, there is a greater
role for the state in providing information. As countries develop, the private sector often
evolves to meet information needs. In the U.S for example, screening institutions like the
NYSE (a cartel of traders who set commissions and limit entry) subject companies
seeking to be listed by the exchange to stringent screening which encourages voluntary
disclosure and limits purely speculative or bogus ventures from being listed.
In developing countries, the demand for transparency is outpacing the means to
ensure it. While institutional structures that enable transparency take time to develop,
globalization and integration of markets have increased the need for greater transparency,
prompting intermediary solutions. Governments have undertaken innovative experiments,
which, using market-like mechanisms to induce self-revelation of information, as
exemplified by the recent auctioning of telecommunication subsidies in Chile (section
IV) have proved to be very successful. Also, involving local communities in monitoring
government services has been shown to foster transparency and lower corruption. This
matter is further discussed in Section 5.
The foregoing discussion suggests that a deeper theoretical and empirical
understanding of how transparency affects development outcomes for individuals and for
the economy as a whole, will help refine our understanding of how it can improving the
effectiveness of policy.  In what follows, we use the definition outlined above to examine
the role of transparency in promoting financial stability and in improving the
accountability of governments and propose policies to effect transparency  - surveying
existing literature and identifying areas where more research is warranted.
III. Transparency ‘s role in Financial Stability
 
Lack of information and uncertainty are inexorable features of finance, since
capital markets are engaged in uncertain intertemporal trade not only in money but in
information itself.  Essential information gathering undertaken by markets include
selection of projects, and monitoring of project performance. These present specific
challenges. The fact that some firms have better information than lenders about the risk
attached to projects, induces asymmetries of information which give rise to problems of
adverse selection. The inability of lenders to observe the actions of borrower produce
moral hazard. Enforcement or, monitoring is also subject to information problems. In
order to elicit behavior by agents to generate a good profile of return, lenders have to
design contracts that get around information problem (demand collateral), that provide
good incentives and monitor borrowers.
However, information will always be imperfect. No matter how well financial
markets perform in gathering information, borrowers will always know more than lenders
about how they will spend the loans, about their ability, effort and so forth. To this we
attribute a number of persistent problems in financial markets. Under-supply of9
information occurs because individuals who monitor the performance of firms or banks
are providing a benefit to all shareholders or depositors, but invest resources in this
monitoring only to the level of their private benefit, not the broader socially desirably
level. Imperfect markets and credit rationing occurs because information is costly; credit
rationing because those who are willing to pay higher interest rates may not be those who
put the loans to best use. Contagion, as in bank panics, is evidenced when the troubles of
one institution ‘contaminates’ perceptions of the entire industry. Depositors or investors
who cannot distinguish individual bank solvency, run on all banks, even solvent ones.
The vulnerability of financial systems may worsen these problems. The failure of a
financial institution, stock market crashes and recessions, may increase uncertainty,
worsen information asymmetries and aggravate adverse selection problems.
The pubic good-like  good property of information provides a rationale for
government intervention to increase public disclosure of information. But it is not
apparent whether such intervention can sufficiently mitigate other adverse consequences
of information problems; will more disclosure reduce problems of credit rationing, reduce
market volatility or avert banking crises?
Presently, the paucity of theoretical and empirical investigation is at least partly
attributable to data problems. We will identify the gaps of understanding in this area both
at the conceptual and empirical level, beginning with following section, which
summarizes the evidence on transparency and financial crises.
Evidence on the Relation Between Transparency and Financial Crises
The 80s have witnessed a dramatic increase in banking crises in developed and
developing countries. The fiscal and economic costs of the crises have been staggering
(see Goldman and Turner: 1996, Caprio: 1996). They have sparked heated debates about
those policies thought crucial to promoting financial stability. Accordingly, transparency
has gained prominence in recent debates on the financial crises.
Lack of transparency has been suggested as one of the factors that contributed to
the international financial crises. By now the story is familiar. Typically, it is related to
how for instance, limited information about mutual guarantees, of firms' and banks' true
net worth, and the use insider relations, masked poor investments. Once a downturn set
in, poor transparency made it difficult for investors to distinguish between firms and bank
that were healthy and those that were not.  Consequently they abandoned them all,
forcing bank runs and destabilizing of economies.
However, very few attempts have been made, in this context,  to systematically
understand the notion of transparency, the underlying causes of lack of transparency and
its impact. Several questions still remain: Does lack of transparency cause a crisis or
prolong it? Will greater transparency prevent banking crises? Has the need for
transparency increased with global financial integration and liberalization of financial
markets? And does more transparency lead to greater market discipline, and can it replace
regulation-i.e. deposit insurance?  Such emerging empirical research suggest that where
financial liberalization takes place in an environment where transparency is absent, a10
financial crisis is more likely (Mehrez and Kaufmann, 1999). Nonetheless, as detailed
earlier, an unambiguous empirical causal link between transparency and financial
stability is difficult to establish because the inherent measurement problems for
transparency.  Hence, the need to expand on the empirical measurement research agenda,
as well as implementing rigorous tests of causality.
Corruption may be associated with lack of transparency. However, evidence
linking corruption
9 to crises in East Asian countries is weak: there is little justification
that it may have caused the crises. (Furman and Stiglitz:1998). Furthermore, low
corruption is not sufficient to avert crises. Scandinavian countries that are among the least
corrupt suffered banking crises at the beginning of the decade. Also, countries with no
corruption may have little transparency in their banking systems if regulations do not
require disclosure. While it is plausible that corruption, lack of rule of law make it
difficult to achieve transparency, they do not measure transparency, per se.
Caprio et al (1998) go a little further in measuring transparency. In an empirical
study to evaluate the role of information and incentives in financial crises they develop a
scoring system to compare the regulatory environment in a dozen East Asian and Latin
American countries. A ranking of transparency is generated based on whether bank
ratings are required, on the number of top ten banks with ratings from international rating
firms, and on an index of corruption - see table below. The rankings are broadly
consistent with the overall raking of regulatory environments.
10
The study finds that the most crisis-hit Asian economies are those with the
poorest overall scores. These also enjoyed lower-than-average levels of transparency in
the sample. Singapore, the highest scoring country in the sample, overall and in terms of
transparency, was also least affected by the crises. Although the relative importance of
the different indicators is not assessed, the evidence does suggest that the quality of the
regulatory environment, including its transparency, may be particularly important in the
presence of explicit deposit insurance. It also suggests that safety nets tend to increase the
moral hazard problem and blunt the incentives for agents to acquire or use information.
In addition, it is indicates policies such as capital controls may be rendered ineffective if
balance sheet information masks banks' true liabilities.
On the whole, present evidence, subject to the imperfections in the measurement
of transparency, does not support the hypothesis that a lack of transparency caused the
crises. But the evidence does suggest that lack of transparency may exacerbate the crises.
Accordingly bank runs may be averted by better disclosure if investors could discern
healthy banks from insolvent ones. In general, the evidence suggests that more
information strengthens market discipline, provided the information is timely and reliable
and that other regulatory instruments are employed to improve the incentives to provide
and use information and enforce compliance.
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The evidence illustrates that there are at least three central means to achieving
transparency: improving mechanisms (rules/regulations) for greater disclosure and
accounting practices to enforce quality and reliability of information, designing safety
nets to limit moral hazard via greater disclosure, and more broadly, instituting regulatory
regimes and policies to address the information and incentive problems inherent in
financial markets.
Sound Accounting and Auditing Practices
There is a strong case for strict accounting norms. Disclosure alone is not enough to
implement transparency. Information must be reliable, based on sound principles and
standards that enabling investors and lenders to make consistent assessments of firms'
activities and risk profiles. Accounting standards facilitate the interpretation, reliability,
and comparability of information across enterprises and make it easier for investors to
identify worthy firms and evaluate managers. Conversely, lapses in accounting norms can
provide opportunities for misrepresentation as means to divert assets. A prevalent
weakness of many accounting systems is the ease with which they can be manipulated to
mask the discrepancy between the accounting values of assets and their real value.
Discrepancies typically owe to asset attributes such as risk or profitability, which are
uncertain or can be misrepresented. For instance, the accounting valuation of long term
bonds typically ignores market expectations concerning interest rates. The Chilean
financial crisis of the early 1980s and the Savings and Loans scandal in the United States
have been cited as owing to such problems
11 In Chile, Central Bank loan guarantees to
domestic banks, was perceived as absorbing the foreign exchange rate risk attached to an
impeding devaluation. Domestic firms did not enjoy such guarantees. This enabled banks
to borrow short term from the international market at 20%, and lend the same money to
domestic firms at 50%. This inflated accounting earnings of the banks. However, once
the anticipated devaluation arrived, the borrowers defaulted, the banks declared
insolvency, and the Chilean government was left to pay off bank depositors and foreign
investors. (Ackerlof and Romer:1993)
Challenges to developing countries
If even developed countries, with their often well developed institutions, fail to
contain information failures arising from accounting problems, it is important to note that
most developing countries have weak accounting systems - owing, in large part, to lack
of trained accountants and weak enforcement. This contributes to lack of transparency.
Common problems include the following:
Insufficiently rigorous accounting conventions are not enough to prevent banks and
borrowers from concealing the true size of their non- performing loans. Even if problem
loans are identified, adequate loan loss provisions remain to be established. Goldstein and
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Turner:1996 calculate the ratio of loan loss reserves to non-performing loans for a sample
of developing countries in 1990s – and find that on average countries with the highest
share of non-performing loans (with the exception of Argentina and Malaysia) are the
ones with the lowest provision coverage ratios.
Lack of uniform reporting requirements for banks and penalties for publishing false
information have seriously impaired the ability of investors to distinguish weak from
strong banks. (Goldstein: 1997).  Private credit rating agencies such as Moody's Investor
service and Standards and Poors, limit coverage to a mere 25 developing countries and
serve only the largest banks in those countries.
Poor information systems have exacerbated the problem of assessing the credit
worthiness of borrowers. Computer software to assess creditworthiness and track the
probability of default is not yet used in many developing countries.
Inadequate supervision and enforcement - credit review process, audit practices
exacerbated by lack of access to information about borrower files' results in weak
enforcement of accounting rules and hence poor compliance.
Poor accounting standards also render other policies such as capital requirements
inadequate. For example, the Basle Capital Adequacy Accord may not be adequate for
developing countries with poor accounting and supervision - as documented above - and
more volatile environments. Implicit in the Basle standards is the assumption that there is
adequate provisioning for bad loans. As documented earlier, with the poor loan loss
provisioning and wide prevalence of connected or related-party lending that obtains in
many developing countries, the Basle capital requirements provide very little cushion of
safety. In light of the discussion above several lessons emerge.
Evidence from countries beset by the recent financial crises suggests that they
were affected by accounting failures, specifically, that disclosed financial information did
not portraying underlying risks among firms and banks. The following box summarizes
the findings of the study.
________________________________________________________________________
Box 1: Accuracy in Accounting and the Asian Crisis
A 1998 UNCTAD study reviewed accounting practices in five East Asian countries (Korea, Thailand,
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines) to assess how actual accounting practices deviated from published
accounting statistics– such as related-party-transactions, foreign currency debt, derivative financial
instruments and contingent liabilities, to name a few. The findings suggest that the five countries did not
follow International Accountancy Standards (IAS) in the above mentioned categories, and that this likely
triggered the financial crises. Because disclosed statements of financial transactions did not comply with
International Accounting Standards, users of the accounting information were likely misled and were not
able to take precautions in a timely fashion.
A number of findings are particularly telling. For instance, only a third of the total number of
companies sampled disclosed information regarding related party borrowing and lending- revealing weak
enforcement. Also, although 60 percent of the sample revealed foreign currency debt in local currency only
19 percent disclosed foreign currency translation gains and losses, according to IAS. Furthermore, the study
observed that appropriate levels of loan loss provisions were not made and therefore that the liquidity13
positions of banks due to non-performing loans was not evident. In addition, more than eighty percent of
those companies that reported the use of derivative instruments did not disclose the amount of interest and
losses relating to derivatives, and the terms, conditions, and policies regarding these instruments. Almost
no company disclosed the risks associated with the issuance of derivative instruments. Lastly, with respect




Implementing improved accounting practices
First, governments must make every effort to devise national standards for
accounting, using internationally acceptable standards and accounting methodologies that
are applied consistently over time and cover all relevant transactions. This ensures that
information is reliable and improves the ability of supervisors to assess risks and punish
offenders.
While provision of reliable information is assumed to be the task of governments
(due to the public good nature of information) there may be an important role for the
private sector. In the US private firms prepare credit reports on individuals and routinely
share them with other investors and help them assess risks. The Working Group
Committee report on transparency and accountability (1998) recommends exploring
partnerships with private institutions and organizations to help in the assessment of
information and its effective utilization.
Second, policies for setting standards for accounting and supervision have to be
tailored to the specific infrastructure and regulatory environment of developing countries.
As such, the proposal for harmonizing accounting standards across countries in order to
institute a uniform international banking standard has led to some controversy- countries
may validly wish to maintain some independence in setting national standards based on
their preferences for risk or their institutional limitations.
Third, governments must improve enforcement. Sound accounting standards have
little use without legal and institutional systems to supervise and enforce their adoption.
Devising a supervision system that is effective is quite challenging and requires detailed
research into the institutional structure of the regulatory system of a country in order to
understand the micro-details of the supervision process and identify its weaknesses. For
example, when bank owners and officers happen to be well connected politically, and
penalties imposed on offenders are correspondingly nonexistent - a problem of many
developing countries - it is important to understand where the exact loopholes in
supervision are, what it will take to close them. Such research is currently lacking in
many ways. 
Fourth, international institutions can and should help in strengthening and
implementing accounting standards and ensuring compliance. They can help to identify
weaknesses in the accounting systems of developing countries and provide technical
assistance to aid in the development of appropriate standards. They can improve
compliance with these standards by making provision of loans conditional on adherence
to these standards.14
Regulation
Information provision and monitoring, as promoted through accounting standards,
is not sufficient if appropriate behavior is not enforced. Designing appropriate regulations
for financial markets is a complex matter - indeed regulation may not always be
warranted. Why do financial institutions need to be regulated in the first place? Should
there be any controls imposed on their borrowing, the maturity and risk structure of their
assets and liabilities, or on their loan provisioning ?
Information asymmetries in financial markets complicates efforts to devise
appropriate regulatory policies that mitigate perverse incentives and stabilize markets. If
information was perfect there would be no incentive problems - indeed any need for
banks or financial regulation. Financial risk is chosen by individuals and institutions, and
is induced by the information and regulatory environments that individuals and firms
face.
Deposit Insurance and Disclosure: A trade off?
Safety net provisions such as deposit insurance, which mitigate the consequences of
contagion in the bank industry and thus avert bank runs, may also have destabilizing
effects. Prominently, it endows banks with a form of limited liability that induces two
particular forms of incentive problems. The first is that it encourages over-investment in
risky projects – a moral hazard problem. The second is that it induces a form of behavior
described as `looting’ or `bankruptcy for profit’ which allows owners and managers to
divert corporate assets in the form of personal dividends and salaries. In the case of
insolvency the cost of both these problems is borne by the government in the form of
insurance payouts and bailouts. (Akerlof and Romer:1993). These two incentive
problems are often complementary, and it may be difficult to distinguish between them,
especially as causal precipitants of adverse shocks.
While these problems may be mitigated by better disclosure of information – for
instance through better accounting requirements -  the very presence of deposit insurance
may reduce incentives to use that information, and to punish banks accordingly by
lowering deposits or demanding higher deposit rates. Design of such safety nets therefore
requires a right balance between protecting against liquidity crises and avoiding the moral
hazard problems that give rise to imprudent banking practices.
At one end of the spectrum are frameworks which presume that full disclosure
can replace the need for a safety net.  Since 1996, New Zealand has been subscribing to
such a framework. It provides no deposit insurance, and has abolished prudential ratios
except for capital requirements and ratios on connected lending. Meanwhile it mandates
the most extensive disclosure requirements in the world. Full firm disclosure is required,
as are frequent external audits and credit ratings disclosures. To give these laws teeth, it
has legislated personal liability and accountability for managers of financial institutions.
( Cordella and Yeyati: IMF Working paper,1997).
However, there at least three prominent conditions for the success of this market-
reliant approach to financial system management. First, incentives for market discipline
may depend on whether a no-bailout position in the event of bank failure is credible. In15
Venezuela, political pressure forced bailouts of banks despite a prior commitment to the
contrary. (de Krivoy: 1995). In Japan, regulatory forbearance (implicit insurance) stands
in for unpopular explicit bailouts. (Calomiris: 1997). Indeed, there is a debate about
whether ambiguity in rules governing safety nets is preferable to transparency.
Theoretically,  ambiguity reduces the moral hazard by undermining bailout guarantees
and may at the same time improve credibility if a "no bailout' position is not viable in
practice. Countries have adopted different strategies. In United Kingdom,  a 1979
banking act safeguards deposits, credibly commits the Bank of England  not to support all
banks, but also leaves the Bank with discretionary powers to provide assistance when it
sees the threat of systemic failure. (Cordella and Yeyati, IMF working paper: 1997)
Second, whether transparency leads to more market discipline depends on extent
to which depositors use information about banks to place their deposits -and whether this,
in turn, limits the extent to which banks take excessive risks. Presently, there is no
evidence on the sensitivity of the level of deposits or rates with respect to greater
information disclosure or the presence of a safety net. In addition, evidence is also
lacking on depositors’ ability to interpret information when it is available. If this were
indeed a limitation for depositors it would call for more transparency in bank activities.
Such issues are currently being addressed by a research project undertaken by World
Bank Research Project.
Third, the notion that safety net schemes should be replaced by stricter disclosure
requirements implies that greater transparency can avert crises/panics. The existing
evidence, presented earlier, does not support this hypothesis.
Evidently, more research, both theoretical and empirical, needs to inform future
design of comprehensive financial safety nets, including deposit insurance . Such work
will help determine the real trade-off of improved disclosure - i.e., whether market
discipline is enhanced by disclosure - and the institutional infrastructure that is needed for
improving information provision and creating incentives for ensuring its compliance and
use. Research should also address other necessary forms of intervention. Such evidence
as exists on means of mitigating incentive problems in financial markets illustrates the
merit of using combinations of simple, easily implementable policies, including, limits on
credit expansion and risk-based capital adequacy requirements. While a treatment of
these interventions is beyond the remit of this paper, they are discussed prominently in
Stiglitz and Bhattacharya: 1999.
The limits to financial sector reform
The success of reforms that focus on the regulation of financial markets - or any
other markets – are in the penultimate dependent on institutions of governance. Thus far,
we have assumed that governments will be motivated to increase transparency in the
financial sector, where it is feasible to do so.  That is, we have discussed a number of
implementable measures to promote transparency in a particular sector, but have left
aside the issue of whether the government will be interested in undertaking these reforms.
This assumption presupposes a different kind of transparency: that relating to the
integrity and accountability of governments. Notably, it links implicitly financial sector
reform to broader reform of the system of governance. Suppose that government agents
have the potential to extract bribes from private-sector organizations in exchange for16
preferential treatment by the government bureaucracy.  A system of poor accountability
in the financial sector may facilitate such transactions, since it will make it easier for the
illicit payments to be hidden from view.  In such a world, lack of financial transparency
and poor government accountability will be mutually reinforcing, as is illustrated in the
following box.  This underscores the importance of working to improve transparency in
an economy as a whole, rather than in narrow sectors.
______________________________________________________________________
Box 2: Governance and Finance: Corruption in Indonesia
One particularly infamous example of what may be viewed as excessively close the business-government
ties is the system of patronage that evolved in Indonesia under President Suharto.  Many firms reportedly
sought the assistance of those with close ties to the President, so as to receive preferential treatment from
the government.  Of course, Indonesia's financial markets were notoriously opaque, which made it
impossible to properly document such misconduct or to hamper that continued purchases of government
favors.  Thus, those with the potential to do so had little incentive to change the system.
While the opacity of financial transactions makes it difficult to assess the extent of corruption, it may still
be possible to do so with some innovative thinking.  In the case of Indonesia, Fisman (1999) looks at the
reaction of investors on the Jakarta Stock Exchange to news about President Suharto's health, to try to
estimate the value of political connections in that country.  The results of Fisman’s paper are illustrated by
the following graph, which shows the market reaction to news that Suharto's wife had died, and to the
announcement that Suharto would go to Germany for a health checkup.  Both events raised doubts as to the
President's longevity, and in both cases, the value of well-connected firms declined by more than the value
of firms without connections.  Moreover, Fisman observed that the trip to Germany was perceived to be a
much more serious threat to Suharto's health than the death of his wife (note, for example, that the overall
market declined by considerably more in reaction to news of the German hospital visit).  Accordingly, the
adverse consequences for well-connected firms (relative to less connected firms) were more serious in
reaction to the trip to Germany, i.e.,. the dotted line is much steeper than the solid line.
Building on these observations, Fisman computes that as much as a quarter of a well-connected firm's value
may be attributed to political connections.  Thus, using only public information, Fisman is able to estimate
investors' valuations of connections to Suharto, by examining the aggregation of these valuations as
expressed in market prices.  Hopefully, revealing the extent of the problem through this type of exercise
will motivate increased pressure to bring about change.17
Source:Fisman:1998
________________________________________________________________________
As illustrated, good governance may be seen as a predicate for transparency in the
financial sector, as well as other areas of economic and social life governed by public
institutions. The links between transparency and good governance are treated at greater
length in the following section.
IV. Transparency and Good Governance
Information is central not only to markets but also to the design of public policy,
including the administration of tax systems, public service delivery, and regulation of the
private sector, all activities that affect economic life and social welfare. Consequently,
lack of transparency in public administration is a crucial constraint on policy
implementation and its economic and social outcomes. Addressing this constraint
remains a crucial means of promulgating a consistently successful public policy. A sin-
qua -non for doing so is to improve transparency in public institutions and policy-making
processes.
 For the purposes of this paper we focus on how lack of transparency  increases the scope
for corruption, by creating informational asymmetries between regulators and regulated
entities. Corruption affects all three major areas of public administration: revenue
collection as a means of raising public funds; revenue allocation as a means of providing,
among other things, public goods; and public regulation as a means of mitigating









































Wi fe   Di es:
JSX d r ops
0. 8%
Rumor s o f
St r oke;  T ri p
t o
Ge r m any:
JSX d r ops
2. 5%18
Public revenue collection: Tax laws- especially when difficult to understand or “vaguely”
specified - increase the discretionary powers of government in granting tax incentives,
assessing tax liabilities, auditing accounts, and reporting tax frauds.  Thereby they may
increase incentives for corruption, which in addition to undermining trust in government,
as discussed below, also has the immediate effect of reducing tax revenues. Analysis
using cross-country data suggests that countries with high degree of transparency (as
measured by?) also experience very low incidence of tax evasion. (see fig)  Dani- please
explain the data and insert figure (latest you have)
Public revenue allocation: A lack of transparency n the processes and procedures that
determine the allocation of public expenditure can allow investments to be diverted away
from much needed education, health programs, toward other purposes, notably those
seeking to exploit opportunities for rent extraction. Tanzi and Davoodi: 1997 provide
empirical support for the effect of corruption on the size and composition of public
expenditure. They find that a wide range of public administrative failures – broadly
categorized as corruption – are attributable to inadequate transparency. Opportunities for
corruption arise particularly in public services where the discretion exercised by local
administrators is very large.
Prominently, lack of transparency and enforcement are the main reasons for
investments to be chosen not according to need but according to opportunities for
corruption.  For instance, while anti-poverty or income support programs occupy a large
fraction of the expenditure budgets of governments in developing countries, leakages of
benefits to ineligible recipients result in many deserving individuals failing to receive
assistance.
Public regulation: A lack of information affects the government’s ability to mitigate
information failures in markets. As mentioned previously, information failures impede
the functioning of all markets, especially capital markets. Governments create rules and
regulations, firstly to improve transparency through disclosure laws, and create of
standards to verify quality, and second to improve enforcement using penalties for fraud
to facilitate credible commitments. Such policies lower information costs and the costs
for specifying, negotiating, and enforcing contracts that enable economic exchanges.
Regulations, while essential for improving market efficiency, also concentrate
power in the hands of officials who implement them. When regulations are vaguely
defined and when execution is non-transparent, they create incentives for corruption.
Lack of transparency may be manifest in non-competitive granting of authorization, like
licenses. Such distorted incentives defeat the purpose of governments' regulatory role - to
improve the performance of markets - and are likely to sustain and even worsen the
shortcomings of the market. In addition to the corruption problems outlined above, a lack
of transparency undermines the institution of democracy and development more broadly,
as discussed earlier (Stiglitz: 1999).
The lesson is not to effect complete deregulation but to devise regulatory policies
that mitigate incentives for corruption by increasing transparency and improving19
incentives for compliance. Such policies should assist in monitoring and enforcement and
limit the discretionary power that regulations grant to the officials implementing them.
Institutions should be supported that improve the flow of information, enabling
transparency and trust.
More broadly, to devise policies that promote good governance efforts should be made to
a) facilitate the collection and sharing of information that is critical to the design of
various institutions and  policies, and b) limit abuse of power by bureaucrats by enabling
a system of monitoring and incentives that promotes openness and accountability. A
critical component of a good governance program  is data collection and analysis of
various indicators which can identify the causes and costs of corruption as well as areas
of vulnerability in the public sector. In addition to providing valuable information that
can be used in setting priorities for reform, detailed data and methodologically sound and
rigorous analysis increases transparency, educates and empowers the public with hard
evidence, reduces resistance to reforms by bureaucrats and government official and
improves public accountability. (see box below)
___________________________________________________________________
Box 3:  Transparency through in-depth data analysis,  participation and collective action
Over the past year, dissemination, analysis and debate of corruption surveys in Albania, Georgia, Latvia,
Ecuador, Bolivia and other countries have improved the momentum and quality of subsequent governance
reforms conducted with the help of the World Bank.  This has been accomplished by combining rigorous
data collection, its analysis and the broad dissemination of data. The implications of detailed surveys of
public officials, enterprises and households  were discussed in public workshops and disseminated to
members of the business community and civil society. The Latvian government organized a workshop on
corruption in June 1997, and presented the basic program in June 1998, simultaneously introducing data
collection which is still in progress.  Survey results were printed on the front page of every major
newspaper.
The initiative enjoyed significant results. In Albania, the data allowed the policy debate to
graduate from exchanges of vague unsubstantiated accusations to a process focussed on empirical evidence
that promoted accountability and action. Crucially, there is indication that the reforms have succeeded in
institutionalizing the data collection practices - so that statistics can be collected frequently and
disseminated as needed. They have thus managed to sustain the benefits of reform. In the three countries ,
NGOs helped the process by hiring surveyors who later came to serve as independent monitors of the anti
corruption reforms.  More broadly, new techniques helped elicit additional information from firms on
expected exchange rate volatility that complemented official macro-economic and risk rating agency
information.  Extracting the additional information through econometric techniques thus became a pro-
transparency tool,  which when utilized in a timely manner, may mitigate the likelihood of a crisis.
Source: Kaufmann, Pradhan and Ryterman: 1998;  Kaufmann, Mehrez and Shmuckler, 1999
___________________________________________________________________
 Notably, governments have made great strides in fostering policies and institutions that
promote transparency and its implementation. Measures that exemplify this trend include
the following:
Freedom of information legislation: Institutional arrangements are necessary to help
governments achieve transparency. Transparency is enabled by various media channels
(TV, newspapers, radio, and public notices). It also requires institutional channels for the
citizens to participate – to voice concerns and to provide feedback.  Freedom of speech,20
and a free press ensure that such channels remain open. To improve transparency, many
governments have imposed disclosure requirements on themselves. For example, the
freedom of Information Act in the United States, passed in 1972,and similar legislation in
other countries, recently in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Malaysia, requires the
government to make accessible to citizens an exhaustive array of records of government
actions and debates. Collating its findings on such efforts in the area of fiscal
transparency, the IMF has developed a code of good practice on Fiscal Transparency.
(See box below)
______________________________________________________________________
Box4: IMF CODE ON FISCAL TRANSPARENCY
1.  Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities
·  The government sector should be clearly distinguished from the rest of the economy, and policy and
management roles within government should be well defined. Additionally, there should be a clear
legal and administrative framework for fiscal management.
2.  Public Availability of Information.
·  The public should be provided with full information on the past, current, and projected fiscal activity
of government.
3.  Open Budget Preparation, Execution, and Reporting.
·  Budget documentation should specify fiscal policy objectives, the macroeconomic framework, the
policy basis for the budget, and identifiable major fiscal risks.
·  Budget estimates should be classified and presented in a way that facilitates policy analysis and
promotes accountability.
·  Procedures for the execution and monitoring of approved expenditures should be clearly specified.
·  Fiscal reporting should be timely, comprehensive, reliable, and identify deviations from the budget.
4.  Independent Assurances of Integrity
·  The integrity of fiscal information should be subjected to public and independent scrutiny.
Source: IMF (1998), Public Expenditure Management Handbook: 1998, World Bank.
___________________________________________________________________________________
In some countries, the benefits of information legislation are eroding even well-
established privacy laws, which stipulate for example that information about health status
of individuals or their taxpayer records is confidential. Recently, experts have
recommended violations of privacy in order to use public pressure or the market to
enforce compliance among tax payers. Several countries, including Sweden and Japan
make lists of tax payers public showing taxes assessed, taxes paid voluntarily, or taxes in
arrears. This approach is justified because of its potential use as tool of tax enforcement.
Freedom of Press: As numerous authors have noted, public action is less likely to fail in
societies where information can flow freely and public desire for action expressed
without fear of official sanction.  Accordingly, a free press - newspapers, radio and TV-
is essential for promoting good governance and ensuring that social needs are met.
Democracy and a free press have been instrumental in preventing major catastrophes.
Nowhere is the importance of this greater than in the case of famines. Since
independence, India, one of the largest democracies in the world has succeeded in
escaping major famines. This is in large part due to a relatively free press, which
publicized information about mass starvation and death, prompting action from
governments. (Sen 1987, Dreze and Sen: 1995).21
More broadly, current empirical research indicates that countries with improved
civil liberties are significantly more successful in addressing corruption (see Figure
below)—even after controlling for other determinants (Kaufmann and Sachs 1999).  A
major challenge for countries where civil liberties have not been fully guaranteed is to
promote approaches for civil society to operate more effectively.
Notably, there are subtle limits to the efficacy of press freedom legislation. In even the
freest countries, the government’s ability regulate access to information often forces the
media to purchase scarce information with “discretion.” i.e to exercise self-censorship for
fear of offending their sources, and thus not being able to access information in the
future. This is not a repudiation of press freedom however, but merely a cautionary note
on its limitations.
Information Infrastructure: The information revolution has reduced the costs of
transferring and evaluating information, allowing for sophisticated and rapid
dissemination of data and empirical analysis. This can be harnessed to aid transparency.
There are many examples of innovative efforts to use such technologies. For example,
computerization of tax systems in relatively poor countries has improved information
capture and processing capabilities. Computerization can also improve transparency-
allowing for extensive cross-checking of information, for computerized selection of
taxpayers for audits, for monitoring audit procedures, and enabling timely response to tax
payer requests for information and assistance. Computerization, if effectively introduced,
can dramatically enhance efficiency of most functions in tax administration. It enables : i)
a tamper-proof, paper-free information base on identity of potential tax payers, third party
information, accounts and transactions, ii) cross-matching of different sources of
information which aids verification of returns filed, iii) greater accuracy in tax collection
and recovery operations, iv) selection of audits, v) enhancing taxpayer information and
assistance. (Dasgupta and Mookherjee:1998). Successful implementation of
computerization in tax administration in Mexico yielded impressive results. Most notable
was the elimination of petty corruption and improvement of revenue collection.
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More broadly, information technologies also aid budgeting, accounting, and more
broadly expenditure management for governments. Increasingly, software packages for
computers are available to enable data gathering and sharing among different
departments and layers of government. Such technologies also help to engender
participation in the design of policies and delivery of policies of services. (See following
section on participation) For example, video conferencing is increasingly being used by
international institutions such as the World Bank to increase stakeholder participation in
development of aid-supported projects
While such technologies provide wider access to information and promote greater
information sharing, they do not necessarily create incentives for greater information
disclosure, nor do they improve the quality of information and ensure its use. Institutions
are therefore still necessary therefore to induce disclosure, ensure compliance and more
generally, promote greater openness and accountability. To the extent that such
institutions are inadequate to the task, they often require reform. Because of its
prominence as a policy question, it is worth considering this field at length.
Legal Enforcement: Rules are only useful to the extent that they are enforced. A sound
legal environment is crucial to enforce rules/regulations. Transparency cannot be
implemented effectively when compliance is weak. For example, the Comptroller
Auditing General (CAG) in India is an exemplary, autonomous institution that renders
transparent the expenditure practices of the Indian Government. However it is seldom
able to curb mismanagement of expenditure. A crucial impediment to its effectiveness is
the lack of power of CAG to impose a sanction- expanding the CAG's mandate to include
continuing monitoring of management reforms to be undertaken in response to the
weaknesses identified during audits is essential. Merely achieving transparency without
attendant mechanisms to impose sanctions or enforce corrective action yields little
benefits. And when transparency is costly to achieve and complementary mechanisms for
corrective action are not in place, its net benefits of could be negative.
Generally, enforcement mechanisms must be in place to ensure that public servants are
accountable for service delivery of outputs in accordance with transparent budgeting and
performance targets. Such mechanisms are achieved, to some extent by establishing
procedures for stakeholders to assess public service delivery, linking budget allocations
to satisfactory service delivery, and making public officials personally accountable for
poor quality services. (Das-Gupta: 1999). Providing an avenue for complaints through
establishment of an accessible and independent grievance redress mechanism is critical to
enforce transparency and accountability.
Regulatory Reform: As illustrated above, an enforcement system that promotes
monitoring, improves accountability and punishes offenders is crucial for implementing
transparency. But independent and effective legal systems are slow to build. Therefore
innovative regulatory reforms may be necessary, devised through cooperation among
government, the private sector, and civil society, which encourage greater voluntary
information disclosure and promote enforcement.23
Notably, reforms should be accompanied by public insistence on having policy decisions
justified and regular reviews of the processes and outcomes of policy. Regulations, while
essential to safeguarding social welfare also vest discretionary power with regulators.
Improving accountability is therefore an important element in the design of regulatory
policies.
Experience indicates that among important principles for implementing transparency and
improving governance in the public sector, the most useful may be the promotion of
partnerships with the private sector in provision and delivery of goods and services. This
allows the government to obtain information through market like mechanisms and limit
unnecessary public support. Analogously, support for “exit” and “contestability” –
providing choices for citizens as consumers of public services may under the right
conditions, allow the government to infer information about public preferences and
improve accountability. These principles are discussed below.
Harnessing private sector participation: In telecommunication industries, the
experiences of many countries like Chile, Ghana, and the Philippines shows that access to
services expands rapidly in privatized markets provided there is competition to ensure
that state monopolies are not replaced by private ones. In addition, servicing remote areas
by using innovative market-like mechanisms to elicit information from the private sector
can help determine the extent of government support required and avoid the pitfalls of
traditional cross-subsidy schemes that promote rent-seeking.
For example, in many countries, government support is assumed essential to
provide access of telephone/communication services to poor areas.  An innovative
experiment in Chile used auctions to elicit information from the private sector to
determine the extent of government support that would be necessary. The government
established a special fund to award subsidies competitively to projects providing
telephone services to remote areas. Many private providers requested less subsidy than
assumed, and in many cases no subsidy at all. If the fund's performance is sustained, then
an almost 100 percent coverage in these areas is assured by 2000.
Promoting Exit and Contestability: Where government plays a monopoly role, such as in
provision of basic education, to assure accountability and so that both private and public
moneys are well used, citizens - both as tax-payers and as demanders -- must have
information with which to judge whether services are being provided efficiently by
specific institutions. Exit options help in eliciting information and improving
accountability.
Use of the principal of exit has particular application in education.  Subsidizing
consumers, not providers of education can increase incentives for better information and
greater accountability. This can be accomplished through routing subsidies either to
providers through per-student (capitation) grants in systems in which students can choose
which schools to attend, or to the consumers directly through scholarships or vouchers.
Compared to the traditional system, in which subsidies are channeled directly to
providers with monopoly power, these alternatives have the advantage that they give
citizens “exit options.” Particularly given information problems related to the provision
of education, introducing such choices remain plausible mechanisms for giving24
consumers more information and making providers more accountable. Vouchers have
been used increasingly for such purposes in both developing and developed economies.
However the costs and benefits of vouchers are still contested. In many instances
exit options may not be feasible, i.e., there may be no contestability. For example, in
education policy, exit options depend on the availability of choice- whether there are
alternative options for consumers to choose from if they are not satisfied with the service,
i.e. the education offered. Often, there are no alternative schools within reasonable
distance to make exit a credible option.
However, even in such instances, voice mechanisms that solicit community and parent
involvement can help safeguard delivery of services. Indeed, as the next section will
discuss, “voice” - incorporating public opinions and preferences in policy design,
planning, and supervision, should inform both regulatory reforms and policy in general.
(Hirshman: 1970)
 Transparency through Voice and Participation
In so far as voice is a means of aggregating information within society – and thus
furthering transparency – all policy making should be predicated on incorporating the
voice and participation of stakeholders in development. World Bank research shows that
the greater the participation of private agents in ownership and management, the better is
service performance.  The obvious challenge is finding means of doing so. When this is
possible however, numerous experiences have demonstrated that listening to the voice of
stakeholders can have a considerable impact.
In Rajasthan, India, a people’s organization entitled Mazdoor Kisan Shakti
Sangathan- MKSS held a public hearing where they exposed misappropriation by local
governments of development funds intended for local workers. This generated village
demand for further insight in the government. Local governments, being under public and
press scrutiny, were compelled to oblige. The results were striking- some government
officials who had diverted some 56,000 rupees ostensibly for the construction of water
channels, promised to return the funds. Partially as a result of the incident, the
Government of Rajasthan recognized the people’s right to official documents and enacted
landmark legislation to that effect in June 1997. (Bhatia and Dreze. 1998)
There are more systematic ways for governments and citizen groups to solicit voice
through surveys and data collection. Client surveys can cast light on citizen's experience
with government services and to identify performance improvement suggestions. Follow-
up surveys can be used to ensure accountability and make sure that improvements are in
the desired direction. Generating data and disseminating it widely can be a potent
instrument to mobilize civil society and apply pressure on political structures. For
instance, well presented and simple comparative charts illustrating findings on corruption
can help mobilize and give voice to previously silent and disparate citizenry groups. (See
box below)
________________________________________________________________________25
Box5: "Voice" as a mechanism to enforce transparency and accountability
Mechanisms such as client and citizen surveys that incorporate feedback from citizens have helped to
improve public sector performance in many countries. The scorecard method pioneered by Sam Paul in
Bangalore, India embodies this approach. It entails periodic evaluation by citizens of local municipalities of
accounts of  public services, and bribery and extortion.  Results are disseminated and discussed and
influence governance reform at the municipal level. There is some evidence that public agencies in
Bangalore have taken concrete steps to improve service delivery. Similar initiatives are now being adopted
in other cities in India and elsewhere.
In Mendoza, Argentina, a city noted for its innovative governance reforms,  citizens have
participated in crafting transparent rules governing public procurement. A number of localities throughout
the world have embraced similar participatory process, notably the city of Porto Allegre, Brazil. As part of
its pioneering system of participatory budgeting  the city holds city-wide assemblies that discuss
expenditure priorities for education, health, transport development, taxation, city organization, and urban
development.  They then elect members to a citywide participatory budgeting council, which in turn
decides the city’s investment plan. Although there is no  rigorous evaluation of this program, ,  preliminary
evidence suggests that the number of roads paved increased, and the number of students enrolled in primary
and secondary school doubled. In 1996 the city’s achievements were recognized by the United Nations.
The results are consonant with the broader understanding that voice and accountability improves welfare,
even on a national level. See graph.
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A logical extension of furthering local community participation is to devolve entirely
some functions of government service provision – e.g. decentralization. By making
officials accountable to local citizens who are in a better position to evaluate the level and
quality of services delivered, a decentralized system allows reliable information
concerning performance to be generated and utilized for enforcement.  Reciprocally,
local citizens are better informed about supply conditions, budgets and expenditures for
local services, thus reducing the information asymmetry between clients and officials that
is largely responsible for corruption. Various examples of such experiments with
participatory local governments are emerging around the developing world, as discussed26
above. (See box) However, their success are dependent on a number of factors. If local
institutions are captured by interest groups or local elites the advantages of
decentralization may be negated. While there are isolated case studies addressing this
topic, an outstanding research issue is a systematic assessment of decentralization
experiments, detailing both successes and failures.
Conclusion
Although the general preference is for more transparency, there are cost and benefits of
achieving transparency.  Much research is still needed to help us measure and understand
the role of transparency in financial markets. Many questions remain: Can more
transparency lead to greater markets volatility and if so, under what conditions? Has need
for greater transparency increased with globalization? Can more transparency obviate the
need for regulation - inducing self-regulation? A systematic inquiry into such issues will
help frame appropriate disclosure policies.
Among the financial reform issues under consideration, more research is
particularly required in assessing the relative merits of financial safety nets, particularly
deposit insurance and disclosure requirements. While the moral hazard problems induced
by deposit insurance may be averted by replacing it with more comprehensive disclosure
requirements, as is done in New Zealand, the experience of countries such as Venezuela,
buttressed by cross country empirical research, suggests that the success of such policies
are contingent on a number of factors, including the credibility and independence of
central banks and political actors, the behavior of banks and depositors, and the dynamics
of financial crises, which are not well understood.
Practical means of improving disclosure when desirable must be part of all
development agendas. This includes instituting sound accounting and auditing practices,
streamlining  reporting requirements, improving information (IT) systems and bolstering
institutional supervision. Experience suggests that given their limited resources,
developing countries may best address these needs by taking advantage of private sector
provision of information and accounting services, building regulatory structures to their
best ability, and tailoring supervision and enforcement means to local capabilities and
circumstances. This may militate against the institution of uniform international
accounting standards currently being debated. Such evidence as exists on means of
mitigating incentive problems in financial markets illustrates the merit of using
combinations of simple, easily implementable policies as treated for instance in Stiglitz
and Bhattacharya: 1999.
 Notably, transparency in and of itself is not sufficient without accompanying
enforcement mechanisms.   There is therefore a need for public institutions to both
regulate disclosure and enforce appropriate behavior. Indeed, as illustrated by the case of
Indonesia – financial reform may be predicated on broader public sector reforms.
Notably, the effectiveness of public institutions affects not only the performance of
markets – including capital markets – but also the allocation of public goods and the
distribution of risk and other implicit costs in an economy. Subsuming more specific
recommendations on transparency in financial markets, made earlier in this paper, are
therefore broader imperatives to improve transparency in governance. Implementing
freedom of information legislation, instituted freedom of press laws, built legal27
enforcement mechanisms, and invest in information infrastructure to improve the
gathering and sharing of information. Many governments are already doing this.
  Since institutions take to time to develop, successful medium term reforms often
entail harnessing supplementary resources. These include soliciting private sector
participation to elicit information about necessary levels of public participation, and
promoting opportunities for exit in certain areas of service provision in order to give the
citizens, as consumers, a chance to indicate their preferences.
Animating many of these reform initiatives is the principle of promoting
transparency through public participation and 'voice'.  As studies increasingly
demonstrate, 'voice,' remains the fundamental means to ensure people's right to
information, to enforce transparency and accountability, and to thus improve the
allocation of public resources. Empowering the voice of citizens with the necessary
evidence through data and data analysis has proved to be successful in implementing
transparency and effecting change.
  Implementing voice entails addressing unique challenges. Though certain practices,
such as decentralization, may encourage voice, they may weaken supervision and thus
paradoxically reintroduce opportunities for corruption treated previously. More
fundamentally, social and cultural circumstances may limit the ability of certain
constituencies - the poor, women, children, from making their voice heard.  Again, on
this issue, as in the narrower problems treated above, more research is urgently needed.
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